(AMS 200: dp. 335; 1. 144'; b. 28'; dr. 8'4"; s. 14 k.; cpl. 39
a. 2 20mm.; el. Blucbird)
The second Redwinq, an auxiliary motor minesweeper, was laid down 1 July 1953 by Tampa Marine Co., Tampa, Fla.; launched 29 April 1954 as AMS-200; sponsored by Mrs. Courtney W. Campbell, wife of U.S. Representative Campbell ot Fla.; and commissioned 7 January 1955, Lt. R. L. Anderson in command.
Assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, Redwing arrived Charleston S.C., 23 January 1955. Reclassified a enastal minesweeper MSC-200, on 7 February, she underwent shakedown out of Key West, Fla., eommeneing 3 March. Returning via Mayport to search for downed aircraft, she arrived Charleston 20 April and commenced minesweeping operations with various units of the Fleet.
Redwing arrived Panama City, Fla., 5 July and provided services to the Mine Defense Laboratory through 9 September. She then joined Tonawanda (AN-89) for special development operations at Key West before returning to Charleston 22 September. Redwing continued to operate out of Charleston until January 1957, participating in minesweeping and amphibious training exercises as far south as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Vieques, P.R.
She departed Charleston 16 January to provide services for the Naval Mine Warfare School at Yorktown, Va., and to operate under the Amphibious Training Command, Little Creek, Va. She then conducted surveys in Boston Channel beginning 3 October, followed by exercises along the New Jersey coast in January 1958.
Departing New York 25 February for exercises as far south as Key West, she returned to Boston 21 March and for the next year provided services for the Destroyer Development Group in Narragansett Bay. Redwing departed Boston 26 February 1959 en route Norfolk, Va., for overhaul in preparation for transfer to Spain. Decommissioned at Norfolk 16 June 1959, she was struck from the Navy list and transferred to the Spanish Navy as Sil (M-29) effective 18 June 1959.
June 28, 2005: One of the worst Days in U.S. Special Operations History
American forces in Afghanistan knew that terrorists were planning to do everything they could to sabotage the elections, from trying to stop people from voting to assassinat- ing the newly elected officials. To interdict Shah’s attempts in the area, Marine Major Tom Wood, the operations officer of the marine battalion based in the region, created a plan that was a joint Marine Corps and special operations mis- sion, code-named Operation Red Wings. (Later accounts, publications, and web sites would incorrectly refer to the mission as Redwing or Red Wing.)
Though Shah and his cadre were the targets, their capture or deaths was just the first, short-term goal of Red Wings. A second part addressed the long-term goal the marines had for the region, the improvement of the lives of the villagers. To accomplish both goals, Major Wood broke Red Wings down into five phases: the first two were to be led by special operations, the other three handled by the marines. The first phase involved reconnaissance and surveillance by a SEAL team to identify and confirm the location of Shah and his men. The second phase called for two SEAL teams to be inserted into the area: one to kill or capture Shah and his cohorts, and a second to establish a security cordon to prevent counterattacks.
Major Wood presented his plan to his SEAL counterpart, Lieutenant Commander Erik Kristensen, who would exercise command over the first two stages. Kristensen changed some of the details. Instead of having his teams enter the suspected area on foot, as Wood proposed, he planned to use the time-tested special operations tactic of a night helicopter insertion by fast rope—troops would rappel down swinging rope lines as quickly as possible. As the noise of the helicopter would inevitably alert anyone nearby, the tactic included a two-part diversion designed to get Shah and his supporters to lower their guard by getting them used to the helicopters’ presence. The first was a series of “dummy drops” conducted during the night leading up to the actual drop itself. Then, on the evening of the real drop, a second helicopter would accompany the one with the SEAL inser- tion team, and, shortly before and after the drop, it would conduct a series of touch-and-go fake landings on a number of locations in the immediate area to confuse any listeners.
The rugged terrain posed serious communications prob- lems. The deep, rocky valleys created numerous line-of-sight blackout areas affecting radio transmissions and reception.
The only radio known to have totally overcome this problem was the powerful (20 watt) PRC-117. But the PRC-117 was big (3 inches high, 10.5 inches wide, and 9.5 inches deep) and heavy—almost 10 pounds without its rechargeable lithium battery. The decision was made to go with the smaller PRC- 148 MBITR (“em-biter”) containing a computer chip that allowed it to make a secure link with a communications satellite.
Kristensen chose Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy to lead the team that would attempt to engage Shah with sniper fire. Unfortunately, the rocky and forbidding terrain and lack of locations with sufficient ground cover for camouflage meant that Kristensen would have to deploy just four men, the smallest possible team. The three SEALs along with Murphy were Navy Hospital Corpsman Second Class Marcus Luttrell, Petty Officer Second Class Matthew G. Axelson, and Petty Officer Second Class Danny P. Dietz. Luttrell and Axelson would be the snipers/shooters, and Murphy and Dietz would serve as spotters. The mission was to last no more than four days.
Meanwhile, Major Wood’s brilliant intelligence officer, Captain Scott Westerfield, had succeeded in compiling a rather complete dossier on Shah and his operation. Wester field identified four likely locations where Shah and his men could be expected to appear on or around June 28. Two were on the east side of the mountain Sawtalo Sar, and two others were on the west. Meetings were held to review the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle images of the area and identify observation and ambush sites, helicopter insertion sites, and landing zones. The decision was made to insert the team about a mile south of the nearest observation and ambush site, near the summit of Sawtalo Sar, the idea being that it’s easier to travel downhill. The team would then advance as fast as possible with the goal of reaching the first observation and ambush site around dawn. They would be traveling light, carrying only about forty-five pounds of gear each. Ominously, all four men had a premonition about the mission. As they made their final preparations, each added extra magazines to their load, just in case.
On the night of June 27, 2005, Lieutenant Mike Murphy and his men boarded the MH-47 Chinook that would ferry them to their mountaintop landing zone. The helicopter then took off from Bagram Air Base into the cold night sky and headed to their destination. Forty-five minutes later the Chi- nook hovered twenty feet above their landing site. The four SEALs quickly rappelled to the ground on the fast rope. Within seconds, the Chinook was gone, and the SEALs were on their own.
It was supposed to be a covert drop, with the only indi- cation of their arrival being the sound of the helicopter’s rotors. But a mistake had been made. The helicopter’s crew chief, accustomed to direct-action raids where speed, not secrecy, is paramount, had accordingly detached the fast rope, allowing the olive-drab line to fall to the ground. In plain view of anyone who might come along during the day was a thirty-foot-long piece of evidence that Americans were there. Groping over the rugged terrain in the gloom, Murphy and Axelson grabbed tree branches and other veg- etation to cover it. Luttrell, meanwhile, got on his radio and contacted the AC-130 gunship riding shotgun overhead:
“Sniper Two One, this is Glimmer Three—preparing to move.”20 After getting confirmation, and with the partially coiled rope now hidden as best they could, the team shoul- dered their rucksacks and began their trek to their observation and ambush site.
It was monsoon season in India, which meant that Afghanistan was subject to unpredictable thunderstorms and thick fog. One storm burst over the SEAL team shortly after they landed. The cold, wind, rain, and steep terrain overgrown in places with thick vegetation made the trek a test of endurance and skill. They managed to reach the near- est of the two designated observation and ambush sites near dawn. Though the location offered a clear view of the val- ley and village below them, it did not provide adequate shelter, and the SEALs were vulnerable to being discovered by a passing local such as a goatherd (what’s known as being “soft compromised”).
Shortly after they took up position, a thick fog bank moved in between the SEALs and the village below. They realized that if fog appeared once, it would probably appear again. They would have to move. Murphy took Axelson with him and began searching for a nearby site that wouldn’t be affected by the weather and that would, he hoped, offer them some protection from detection. After about an hour, he returned and told Dietz and Luttrell they had found one about a thousand yards away.
The new location proved to be better for observation and sniping—they had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire village. If Shah were there, they’d spot him in an instant. Unfortunately, the new site was even more exposed than the first, with only one convenient path in and out. If
they were spotted and that path cut off, they’d have to either shoot their way out or attempt to escape down the danger- ously steep mountain slope.
The SEALs got into position and began their observation. The morning passed quietly. Then, at about noon, Luttrell heard the sound of approaching footsteps. Minutes later three goatherds and about a hundred goats appeared. The SEALs quickly surrounded and detained them. Danny Dietz, responsible for communicating with headquarters, got on his radio and sent back a faint, scratchy message that sent a chill down the backs of the men at headquarters, “We’ve been soft compromised.”21 The operation had just gone wrong—to what extent remained to be determined.
The SEALs began discussing their options. None of the al- ternatives facing them were attractive. The three Afghans, one a boy, were clearly goatherds—they did not have firearms, their only “weapon” an ax for chopping wood. Though the Afghans were able to tell the SEALs that they were not Tal- iban, that didn’t mean they weren’t sympathizers or that they wouldn’t tell the Taliban or Shah’s men of the SEALs’ location if they were set free. Worse, Dietz was having com- munications problems. He wasn’t sure his first message had been received. What he did know was that he would not be getting any answer back. The team was in a radio blackout area. After a short debate in which votes were taken, according to Marcus Luttrell, Lieutenant Murphy confirmed their decision: “We gotta let ’em go.”22 The Afghans and their goats were allowed to leave.
Five minutes after the goatherds had disappeared down the
they were spotted and that path cut off, they’d have to either shoot their way out or attempt to escape down the danger- ously steep mountain slope.
The SEALs got into position and began their observation. The morning passed quietly. Then, at about noon, Luttrell heard the sound of approaching footsteps. Minutes later three goatherds and about a hundred goats appeared. The SEALs quickly surrounded and detained them. Danny Dietz, responsible for communicating with headquarters, got on his radio and sent back a faint, scratchy message that sent a chill down the backs of the men at headquarters, “We’ve been soft compromised.” The operation had just gone wrong—to what extent remained to be determined.
The SEALs began discussing their options. None of the al- ternatives facing them were attractive. The three Afghans, one a boy, were clearly goatherds—they did not have firearms, their only “weapon” an ax for chopping wood. Though the Afghans were able to tell the SEALs that they were not Taliban, that didn’t mean they weren’t sympathizers or that they wouldn’t tell the Taliban or Shah’s men of the SEALs’ location if they were set free. Worse, Dietz was having com- munications problems. He wasn’t sure his first message had been received. What he did know was that he would not be getting any answer back. The team was in a radio blackout area. After a short debate in which votes were taken, according to Marcus Luttrell, Lieutenant Murphy confirmed their decision: “We gotta let ’em go.” The Afghans and their goats were allowed to leave.
Five minutes after the goatherds had disappeared down the
trail, the SEALs had shouldered their gear and were double-timing in the opposite direction. Even though they planned to continue their mission (aborting the mission had not been discussed), they knew they couldn’t stay where they were. They retraced their route to their original location and once again took up position there.
As the minutes ticked by, it appeared that perhaps the herders had not told the insurgents about them. But, about two hours after they had released the Afghans, the SEALs started hearing the noise of movement above and to the left of their position. A large insurgent force that they initially estimated to be at least eighty men, armed with AK-47 assault rifles and RPG launchers, was approaching their position.
Evidence from the ensuing engagement, plus a video of the attack—one of two made by Shah—indicates the Afghan force may have been smaller than the SEALs estimated. Murphy’s Medal of Honor citation puts the number between thirty and forty. Regardless, the fact was that Shah was intimately familiar with the terrain and knew how to use it to best advantage. And he did, attacking from above with his men spread out. Most devastating of all, unlike the SEALs, Shah possessed good communications. He had a commercial two-way radio that somehow was not affected by the blackout that nullified the SEALs’ radios, and he expertly used it to position his men where they would be the most effective. But if the SEALs could manage to buy some time, with their superior training they stood a good chance of turning the tables on Shah and his men. And, therefore, time was the one thing Shah was determined not to give them.
Lieutenant Murphy immediately ordered Dietz to again try to raise headquarters in Bagram, this time for help. And, once again, because of the terrain and atmospheric conditions, Dietz could transmit but not receive messages at Bagram, the words that everyone there hoped they wouldn’t hear came over the loudspeaker: “Contact! We’re hard compromised!” A rescue mission was needed immediately, and preparations were made to launch it.
Meanwhile, the others quietly took aim as the insurgents spread out to the left and right in a classic flanking maneuver. When the lead fighters were about twenty yards from their position, the SEALs opened fire. As hell erupted around them, Dietz delivered more unwelcome news. Once again, he told them he couldn’t establish contact with head-quarters. Strictly speaking, that wasn’t the case. Dietz had been able to reach headquarters, he just didn’t know it.
With their escape route blocked by a superior force in a superior position, and with fighters about to surround them, Lieutenant Murphy ordered his men to retreat down the mountain. After slipping, sliding, and rolling helter-skelter down the rocky slope, with bullets constantly whizzing about them, Luttrell and Murphy landed hard on a piece of flat ground some distance below their outpost. Luttrell would later discover he had cracked some vertebrae. Mur- phy was wounded—shot in the abdomen. Axelson and Dietz soon joined them. Dietz was wounded, too: his right thumb had been shot off.
Unfortunately, Luttrell, their corpsman, had lost his medical supplies during the descent. There was nothing he could do to help either Murphy or Dietz. Worse, the gunfire from the insurgents had not let up. Their only hope for survival was to keep traveling down the steep slope toward the village far below. If the SEALs could get inside one of the huts, they’d have a better chance of holding out against the enemy.
Once again, as the Afghans closed, Lieutenant Murphy ordered the SEALs to jump. They next landed on a small escarpment about thirty feet below. The insurgents, mean- while, maintained a steady rate of heavy fire at the retreat- ing SEALs. Dietz was hit twice more. Though he was severely wounded, they had to keep going. Axelson and Lut- trell took the lead in the descent and, after they reached the next position, provided cover fire for Murphy and Dietz.
The running firefight continued, with the SEALs having to also engage insurgents who had managed to get into position ahead of them. This time, though, there were only three SEALs able to fight. Dietz was dead, and the others were forced to leave their comrade’s body behind. Somehow, Murphy, Axelson, and Luttrell managed to run the gauntlet of RPGs and bullets as they continued their descent. But there were too many enemy fighters and too many bullets. Axelson was hit, in the chest and head.
After the three had reached their latest defensive position, Lieutenant Murphy knew he had to make his call now, or it would be too late. He took out his Iridium satellite phone and tried to call. The signal was blocked by the rocks above him. The only way he’d be able to connect with the com- munication satellites was to move out in the open. Moments later, and in clear view of the enemy, Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy moved out from cover and hit the speed-dial button on the phone.
Ignoring the AK-47 bullets ricocheting off the hard ground around him, Murphy said, “My men are taking heavy fire… we’re getting picked apart. My guys are dying out here . . . we need help.”
Just then, an AK-47 round struck him in the back and burst through his chest. The impact knocked Murphy for- ward and caused him to drop his rifle and phone. Somehow, he managed to reach down and pick both up. After listen- ing on the phone for another moment, he replied, “Roger that, sir. Thank you.”25 Then he hung up and staggered back to his fellow SEALs.
Rescue was finally on the way.
The three surviving men were SEALs, but they were not supermen. Lieutenant Murphy managed to reach a defen- sive position on a section of the slope above Marcus Luttrell and Matthew Axelson before he was finally gunned down. Seconds later, the concussion from an RPG explosion knocked Luttrell down the slope, an event that ultimately helped save his life and made him the only survivor of the ordeal. Luttrell’s last sight of Axelson was of him using his sidearm Axelson had three magazines left for his pistol. When a search party found his body days later, only one magazine remained unused. But as badly as the mission was turning out, what was about to happen would mark June 28, 2005, as one of the worst in U.S. special operations history.
As the SEAL team was being cut down, the attempted rescue had ended in disaster. A quick reaction force of two MH-47D Chinooks, four MH-60 Blackhawks, and two AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters was dispatched from Bagram to try and extract the surviving SEALs. As they flew into the target area, however, they ran into a trap and were subjected to a fusillade of RPG fire, just as had happened twelve years earlier during the infamous “Black Hawk down” firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia. One RPG flew into the open rear ramp door of one of the Chinooks, causing it to lose control and crash into a ravine. The helicopter was destroyed and all personnel aboard, including sixteen SEALs, were killed. Nineteen highly trained special operations warriors and a valuable MH-47 Chinook helicopter had been lost, and Operation Red Wings was a complete disaster.
Somehow, Marcus Luttrell survived. Though suffering numerous shrapnel wounds in addition to his other injuries, he managed to evade the enemy long enough to be discov- ered by a friendly villager who, following the tradition of Pashtunwalli—a generations-old blood code of hospitality— protected him from Shah and his men. Meanwhile, one of the largest U.S. search-and-rescue operations since Vietnam was trying to locate any survivors from the SEAL team, with three hundred personnel committed to the effort. Members of the army’s Seventy-fifth Ranger Regiment finally rescued Luttrell on July 2, five days after Murphy and his team had dropped onto the side of the mountain. A village elder had brought a note from Luttrell to a nearby marine encampment, describing his location and condition.
Members of the Navy Ceremonial Guard stand behind the United States Navy Ceremonial Band during a Medal of Honor Flag ceremony recognizing the actions of Navy SEAL Lt. Michael Murphy held at the United States Navy Memorial. Lt. Murphy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor on Oct. 22 in a ceremony held at the White House. Lt. Murphy was killed during a reconnaissance mission near Asadabad, Afghanistan, while exposing himself to enemy fire in order to call in support after his four-man team came under attack by enemy forces June 28th, 2005. Murphy is the first service member to receive the honor for actions during Operation Enduring Freedom and the first Navy recipient of the medal since Vietnam. Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brien Aho, DVIDSHUB
The 62nd Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, Pre-commissioning Unit (PCU) Michael Murphy (DDG 112) is christened during a ceremony in Bath, Maine. Credit: Petty Officer 1st Class Tiffini Jones Vanderwyst
The 62nd Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, Pre-commissioning Unit (PCU) Michael Murphy (DDG 112) is christened during a ceremony in Bath, Maine. Credit: Petty Officer 1st Class Tiffini Jones Vanderwyst
Guests await the christening ceremony for the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Pre-commissioning Unit (PCU) Michael Murphy (DDG 112) at General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine. Michael Murphy was christened by Maureen Murphy, mother of the ship’s namesake, Navy (SEAL) Lt. Michael Murphy. Murphy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during Operation Red Wings in Afghanistan in June 2005. He was the first Sailor awarded the Medal of Honor since the Vietnam War. Credit: Petty Officer 2nd Class Dominique M. Lasco, DVIDSHUB.
Excerpted from Uncommon Valor: The Medal of Honor and the Six Warriors Who Earned It in Afghanistan and Iraq by Dwight Jon Zimmerman and John D. Gresham. Copyright © 2010 by the authors and reprinted by permission of St. Martin’s Press, LLC.
DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMANis an award-winning author of books, including Uncommon Valor: The Medal of Honor and the Six Warriors Who Earned It In Afghanistan and Iraq, and articles on military history and a member of the Military Writers Society of America.
The Red Tail Squadron
Decorating combat aircraft in assigned colors was in keeping with protocol of the Army Air Force in the World War Two era whereby a group’s aircraft were made easily identifiable. Just by looking at the nose or tail markings, pilots could tell which group was in the air flying alongside.
The Tuskegee Airmen is the popular name of the first all-black military pilot group who fought in World War Two. The group formed the 332nd Fighter Group and the 477th Bombardment Group of the United States Army Air Forces.Because the 332nd’s markings were not striped or checkerboard and because they were a bright color, they were generally regarded as the most distinctive within Fifteenth Air Force. Not surprisingly, the group’s flyers became known as the Red Tails.
The Red Tail Squadron were America’s first black military pilots and their support personnel. They are best known for the extraordinary efforts in the air war of World War II, and for challenging the stereotypes that had kept black Americans from serving as pilots in the U.S. Armed Forces.
In 1940, under pressure from political groups, and responding to the campaign promises of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the USAAC began to accept black applicants to their flight programs. The next year they created a segregated unit for these new aspiring pilots. The program included all the pilots and enlisted support personnel who would give their service to the all-black unit.
The new cadets who would one day compose the Red Tail Squadron were determined to create a record of excellence during their training and future war service so there could be no doubt about their value as patriots and aviators. Their ability to triumph over adversity and go down in history as extremely adept pilots not only proved flight worthiness, but continues to inspire future generations. They were not only pilots – the Tuskegee Airmen were a collective group of thousands of men and women who came together in all the various roles required to enable the pilots in their history-making journey.
This article is part of our collection historical resources on the Tuskegee Airmen. Click here for our comprehensive blog post on the Tuskegee Airmen.
The Behaviour of the Robin.—Part I. The Life-history, with special reference to Aggressive Behaviour, Sexual Behaviour, and Territory. Part II. A Partial Analysis of Aggressive and Recognitional Behaviour
Each breeding pair of Robins own a territory of between 2000 and over 10,000 square yards in size the unshared autumn territory varies between 800 and 6000 square yards.
The owner of a territory sings and attacks other Robins only within its territory, but commonly trespasses when feeding.
The Robin's posturing is aggressive, not courtship, and the red breast is a threat colour.
In the male, song and fighting are prominent in both spring and autumn after pair-formation song declines but aggressiveness increases. Some females hold autumn territories with fighting and song after pair-formation female song is rare but fighting occurs.
Juvenile Robins are occasionally attacked by adults, as are foreign species, especially Dunnocks such fighting is too sporadic to assist food territories significantly.
When a Robin fights to displace the owner of a territory, the fighting is often “formal,” but is occasionally much more serious.
Males obtain mates between mid-December and March. Nest-building occurs near the end of March, followed after a few days by copulation and the male feeding the female. A succession of broods follow until June.
In pair-formation the female enters the territory of a male. How the unmated male distinguishes a potential mate from trespassing Robins is not known. Pair-formation is accompanied by no display apart from sporadic aggressive posturing.
During the pre-nuptial period, which lasts up to fifteen weeks, neither member of the pair displays sexually.
In copulation the female invites the male. The male has no pre-nuptial display.
Apart from copulation, the only “courtship” of the Robin is the male feeding the female this possibly helps to maintain the pair. It is unconnected with copualtion.
The mated male recognizes his mate individually, but has copulated with a stuffed specimen.
Parents do not readily distinguish their own fledgelings from others, and fledgelings do not distinguish their own parents from other Robins.
The spring territory of the Robin seems important as assisting in pair-formation, in maintaining the pair, and perhaps in rapid feeding of the brood. It is doubtful if it limits the breeding density, and it seems unlikely that it insures an optimum population density.
The autumn territory seems functionless, and is perhaps a partial revival of the spring behaviour associated with a similar physiological state.
The Robin shows aggressive behaviour not only towards intruding Robins but, to a varying extent, towards a stuffed adult Robin, foreign species (especially in flight), living and stuffed juvenile Robins, and a stuffed red breast. The external situation eliciting aggressive behaviour seems partially separable into a flying-away movement eliciting pursuit-flight, Robin-shape eliciting striking, a red breast eliciting posturing, and song eliciting song, but these divisions are not complete, for occasionally a Robin will posture at a specimen lacking the red breast, or strike a red breast, or sing at a silent Robin.
The Robin's own mate, which possesses all the above four elements in the external situation eliciting aggressive behaviour, is not normally attacked.
The external situation eliciting aggressive behaviour is not simply another Robin, but every Robin (excluding the mate) in a particular area, the territory, and none outside it. There is one exception, a male without territory may attack, and sometimes ejects, a male with territory.
The internal state promoting aggressive behaviour in the male Robin varies seasonally, with a spring and an autumn maximum. The female has a shorter spring period and a much more variable autumn period. The fluctuations do not follow those of sexual behaviour, nor do they completely coincide with those of song.
In spring an unmated male is moderately aggressive, after pair-formation extremely aggressive, whether pair-formation occurs in mid-December or May. The unmated male in autumn is as aggressive as the spring-mated male.
The internal state shows marked variations in intensity among different Robins, and may vary somewhat from day to day in the same Robin. At the appropriate seasons its strength is sufficient for every intruding Robin to be vigorously attacked, but rarely a living intruder has elicited no attack, or only an ineffective one. Sometimes, on the other hand, it is so strong that foreign species, usually tolerated, are attacked. Further, the internal state cannot be regarded as a unity, since it seems different for striking as compared with posturing, and perhaps for the different types of posturing.
Experiments with caged and stuffed birds show that aggressive behaviour weakens with repetition of a similar external situation producing it under artificial conditions. But during, or immediately after, attack, aggressive tendencies may be temporarily heightened, for several Robins have then mildly attacked their mates, and one vigorously attacked the empty space formerly occupied by the specimen.
Rarely, aggressive behaviour, including posturing, is transferred to man as an object.
The position of the red breast in posturing is closely related to the position of the intruder, being such that the greatest possible area of red is presented.
USA Pottery Mark
If you are familiar at all with pottery, you will notice a large number of pieces that are marked with only "USA". There is not a USA Pottery Company that produced these wares. For a sufficient explanation of why pieces are marked like this, lets start in the 1800's. Back then, most pottery was created to be used in everyday life by an individual that probably lived near you. The makers rarely marked these pieces because beyond there usefulness, the items weren't much to look at. (imagine an old, brown stoneware crock) As pottery techniques matured around the turn of the century, many larger potteries were formed. (think industrialization) Many produced artistic works that the creator would want recognition for his efforts. Anyway, every company had their own rules about marking their wares. Marks would sometimes include company name, logo / symbol, an artist signature, mold number, initials, country, state, city, what they had for lunch, etc., etc. Many companies would include no mark at all. Or, they opted for a simple paper / foil sticker instead. The stickers rarely stayed on the pieces long, and they'd wind up unmarked. Around the time of WW I, many businesses felt a patriotic need to include USA on their goods. This may have been also due to their exporting items overseas. Later on around WWII (I think?), the US government passed a law that all imported goods had to be marked with their country of origin. Some American companies saw this and decided that they no longer needed to include USA mark, because the imports would be stamped "Japan", "China", or whatever and people would know an unmarked piece was made here. Other companies continued to use the USA mark. Others continued to use it, on some types of pottery. Other businesses decided to use it sporadically. Some potteries were only going to use it on Thursdays. (you get the point! ) Basically, if you are going to find out who made your nifty green planter, your going to have to do some research. To start off with, the most prolific of the USA markers was Shawnee & McCoy. Try reading How to Identify American Pottery . The bottom of the homepage on this very site may also be of some use if you are going to track down the origin of a piece. Also, try leaving a post on the forum , someone may be able to tell you who made it. Good Luck!
World War II Mission Symbols
What are mission symbols? Learning about mission symbols painted on aircraft during World War II has proved to be somewhat difficult but interesting research. Mission symbols, also known as mission marks, kill markings and victory decals, are the small symbols painted on the sides of planes, usually near the cockpit or nose, which are used to show the successes of the crews that had flown that particular aircraft. During World War II, these marks or symbols appear not to have been official military markings but rather were given meaning through their repetitive use by the airmen. The markings may be varied in appearance and more than one marking may have similar meanings. Mission symbols were used by all of the Allied and Axis countries participating in the war.
Mission symbols on a B-26 bomber. Capt. James “Jim” C. Brown, pilot from the 557th Bomb Squadron of the 387th Bomb Group standing in front of “Ole Smokey.”
The following chart includes examples of the types of symbols seen on the U.S. Army Air Force planes. Though initially seen on bombers, mission symbols later were also used on fighter aircraft.
Mission symbols on a P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft. Capt. Merle B. Nichols of the 79th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Group, 8th Air Force, sitting atop “Wilda.”
Here are just a few additional interesting facts concerning World War II mission symbols:
- When the camel in symbol #25 is facing in reverse, it indicates that the aircraft had to turn around due to engine trouble
- Symbols of ships were used to indicate enemy ships destroyed. The markings varied according to the type of ship destroyed
- Mission symbols were also used on other military equipment, such as tanks and submarines, to denote the accomplishments of these groups
- On Royal Air Force (RAF) planes, one might see a mission symbol of an ice cream cone. What does that mean? An ice cream cone was used by the British to denote Italy. The British associated Italians with those running ice cream (gelato) shops in Britain prior to the war. Another explanation for the symbol of the ice cream cone is that a mission to Milan or Turin was considered to be a “milk run” by the RAF crews. The term “milk run” was generally used to indicate an easy mission
In my next blog, I will change gears and discuss selected activities of the American Red Cross during World War II.
The images in this blog were selected from the William D. Willis World War II Photographic Collection, one of the permanent collections preserved by the Division of Historical and Cultural Affairs. Mr. Willis of Dover, Del. served as a photographic technician with the Army Air Force during the Second World War. A display of items from the collection, “World War II Through the Lens of William D. Willis,” was on view at Legislative Hall in Dover from March 4, 2015 to Feb. 21, 2016.
Go to the following for Carolyn Apple’s earlier blogs exploring the subjects of images from the state’s William D. Willis World War II Photographic Collection:
Mussolini founds the Fascist party
Benito Mussolini, an Italian World War I veteran and publisher of Socialist newspapers, breaks with the Italian Socialists and establishes the nationalist Fasci di Combattimento, named after the Italian peasant revolutionaries, or 𠇏ighting Bands,” from the 19th century. Commonly known as the Fascist Party, Mussolini’s new right-wing organization advocated Italian nationalism, had black shirts for uniforms, and launched a program of terrorism and intimidation against its leftist opponents.
In October 1922, Mussolini led the Fascists on a march on Rome, and King Emmanuel III, who had little faith in Italy’s parliamentary government, asked Mussolini to form a new government. Initially, Mussolini, who was appointed prime minister at the head of a three-member Fascist cabinet, cooperated with the Italian parliament, but aided by his brutal police organization he soon became the effective dictator of Italy. In 1924, a Socialist backlash was suppressed, and in January 1925 a Fascist state was officially proclaimed, with Mussolini as Il Duce, or “The Leader.”
Mussolini appealed to Italy’s former Western allies for new treaties, but his brutal 1935 invasion of Ethiopia ended all hope of alliance with the Western democracies. In 1936, Mussolini joined Nazi leader Adolf Hitler in his support of Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War, prompting the signing of a treaty of cooperation in foreign policy between Italy and Nazi Germany in 1937. Although Adolf Hitler’s Nazi revolution was modeled after the rise of Mussolini and the Italian Fascist Party, Fascist Italy and Il Duce proved overwhelmingly the weaker partner in the Berlin-Rome Axis during World War II.
In July 1943, the failure of the Italian war effort and the imminent invasion of the Italian mainland by the Allies led to a rebellion within the Fascist Party. Two days after the fall of Palermo on July 24, the Fascist Grand Council rejected the policy dictated by Hitler through Mussolini, and on July 25 Il Duce was arrested. Fascist Marshal Pietro Badoglio took over the reins of the Italian government, and in September Italy surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Eight days later, German commandos freed Mussolini from his prison in the Abruzzi Mountains, and he was later made the puppet leader of German-controlled northern Italy. With the collapse of Nazi Germany in April 1945, Mussolini was captured by Italian partisans and on April 29 was executed by firing squad with his mistress, Clara Petacci, after a brief court-martial. Their bodies, brought to Milan, were hanged by the feet in a public square for all the world to see.
9 Soviet Fighter Planes of WW2 – Some fantastic Airplanes Here
When we talk about Soviet military vehicles of the Second World War, the focus is usually on tank production. But while that’s where the Soviets made the biggest mark, they also produced a wide range of fighter planes in defense of the motherland.
Built almost entirely out of wood, the LaGG-3 was a stopgap plane, developed and put into action while Lavochkin worked on more advanced models.
It compared poorly with the Axis fighters that it faced, being outclassed by Messerschmitt Bf109s, Focke-Wulf 190s, and Macchi C.202s, but it became the basis for a far more effective plane.A series 66 LaGG-3 before take off
The La-5 took the fundamentally sound airframe of the LaGG-3 and turned it into something better. The in-line V-12 engine was replaced by a Shvestov M-82 14-cylinder radial model.
With a supercharger and a top speed of 403mph (over 648 kph), it was a huge step up from what had come before. Maneuverable, fast, and responsive, it out-flew anything else the Soviets had, as well as most of the opposition.
Preparing Lavochkin La-5 FNs for takeoff at the Brezno airfield, now in Slovakia
The La-5 retained the wooden body of its predecessor, to save on scarce materials needed for other weapons and vehicles. After taking flight in 1942, it continued to be refined as engineers used aerodynamics and weight savings to improve the plane’s performance.
Lavochkin La-5, possibly at Kursk. Photo: Unknown CC BY-SA 3.0
Carrying 20mm cannons, the La-5 had the firepower to punch through opposing armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. The wooden frame might be vulnerable, but so were enemies faced with its guns.
Lavochkin La-5 Soviet fighter aircraft “Red 66” of the 21st Fighter Aviation Regiment. Photo: Soviet propaganda – Russian memorial, La-5, series Voyna v vozdukhe (War in the Air) №69 by S.V. Ivanov CC BY-SA 3.0
The third in a series of fighters designed by Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich, the MiG-3 was the one that had the biggest impact on the Second World War.
Mig-3(65) Cockpit. Photo: Aleksandr Markin CC BY-SA 2.0
Based on its predecessor, the poorly performing MiG-1, the MiG-3 incorporated improvements to the wings, propeller, armor, and armament. It had better range, better firepower, and better protection for its pilot.
Soviet Aircraft Mig-3
The MiG-3 still had some serious flaws. It was difficult to fly and performed relatively poorly below 5,000 feet (1,524 meters). But at high altitudes it came into its own, and its high speed gave Luftwaffe planes a real challenge.
Mig-3 in hangar. Photo: Aleksandr Markin CC BY-SA 2.0
MiGs were withdrawn from front line combat in the winter of 1942-3 as they were being badly beaten by improved German planes. They were retained for close support and reconnaissance.
Operation Barbarossa – Destroyed Russian Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 plane
Developed from a dive-bomber which had itself been adapted from an interceptor, the Pe-3 was designed as a multi-role fighter. Only 23 were produced before the German invasion, at which point production of Pe-2 dive-bombers was altered so that half became Pe-3s.
The Pe-3 carried two cannons in its former bomb bay, one in the dorsal turret, and either two more cannons or two machine guns in the nose. Bristling with weaponry, it became a crucial part of the Soviet inventory early in the war, with around 300 taking to the skies.
Unlike most fighters of World War Two, the Pe-3 had twin engines mounted in the wings instead of a single engine in the body of the plane.
First flown in 1933, the Polikarpov I-15 biplane was one of the Soviet Union’s best inter-war planes. During the Spanish Civil War, it was exported to the Republican side and license-built in Spanish factories. There, it proved to be a tough fighter that performed well against enemy planes.
Thousands of I-15s were built. They were used by the Soviets against the Japanese and Finns, as well as being sent to China for use against Japan.
I-15bis RA-0281G. Photo: Aleksandr Markin CC BY-SA 2.0
1,000 were still in use when the Germans invaded in 1941. By now, they were regularly being out-classed by enemy monoplanes, so were mostly used in ground attack operations. They were all pulled from the front line by late 1942.
Aircraft in repair at a Moscow factory during WWII. Photo: RIA Novosti archive, image #59544 / Oustinov / CC-BY-SA 3.0
A contemporary of the I-15, the I-16 took to the air mere months after its sibling. A tiny monoplane with a wooden fuselage, it was one of the most innovative fighters of the early 1930s, though most of the world didn’t see this until the Spanish Civil War.
With a top speed that was 70mph (112 kph) faster than its peers, highly maneuverable, and equipped with four machine guns, it was a great fighter.
I-16 with Chinese insignia, flown by Chinese pilots and Soviet volunteers
The I-16 had a similar career to the I-15. It made its mark in Spain, flown by both Spanish and Soviet pilots, before serving against the Japanese and Finns. Still in use in 1941, it was by then out of date and suffered heavy casualties when fighting Germany planes.
At times during the invasion, desperate Soviet pilots used these planes to ram their opponents rather than give in.
The I-16 was finally withdrawn from the front lines in 1943, long after it should have been.
Khalkhyn Gol, Soviet i-16
Originally designated the I-26, the Yak-1 was renamed during production. Only a few had been made by the time the Germans invaded, but it had been designed to be built as simply as possible and mass production now took off, with over 8,700 eventually built.
An I-26 prototype of the Yak-1
Relatively fast and agile, the Yak-1 could sometimes hold its own against the Messerschmitt Bf109. It helped the Russians to catch up with the capabilities of the Luftwaffe.
The Yakovlev Yak-1 was a World War II Soviet fighter aircraft. Produced from early 1940, it was a single-seat monoplane with a composite structure and wooden wings.
Developed from the Yak-1, the Yak-3 was faster, more maneuverable, and had an excellent rate of climb. It reached the front line in July 1944 and soon got into combat. That month, a flight of 18 Yak-3s defeated a force of 30 German fighters, killing 15 for only one loss.
Yakolev, Yak-3 in flight
Equipped with cannons and machine guns, the Yak-3 was a deadly dogfighter that kept improving thanks to better engines.
Designed in parallel with the Yak-3, the Yak-9 entered production in October 1942 and so beat the Yak-3 into action. It was another success for this line of fighters, effective in combat and with an increasingly impressive range.
While keeping its shape, the construction of its body changed over time, using more aluminum to make it lighter and stronger.
Russian Yakovlev Yak-9.Photo: ddindy CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
The Yak-9 was flown by Free French and Free Polish squadrons as well as Soviet pilots. It continued in use until the 1950s, when it was used in the Korean War.
Redwing II AMS-200 - History
A Short History of Genasys
This document presents a short history of how Genasys II, Inc. was formed and how it happens to be located in Fort Collins, Colorado. Names are often mentioned to show continuity and to help explain why there is so much GIS activity in Colorado.
In early 1976, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), Western Energy and Landuse Team (WELUT) released an RFP for developing computer-aided analysis capabilities for impact and mitigation studies related to strip mining. The initial statement of work called for a computer mapping system, and was quickly evolved into a GIS statement of work. The funding for the project was shared between the USFWS and the Environmental Protection Agency. The contract was awarded to the Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Inc. (a not-for-profit quasi-governmental agency) in late 1976. The work was to be performed in Fort Collins.
At the same time this RFP process was evolving, the USFWS National Wetlands Inventory (NWI) also released an RFP. The statement of work for this RFP was to develop computer-based technologies for digitizing wetlands data directly from aerial photography (stereo pairs). The funding for this project was 100 percent USFWS. This contract was also awarded in late 1979. The company selected to perform the work was Autometric, a Virginia-based company that specializes in software-based photogrammetric systems and imagery exploitation. The work was to be performed in St. Petersburg, Florida.
Both these contracts reached completion in mid-1978. The WELUT contract final deliverable was a software package called MOSS (Map Overlay and Statistical System). The system designer and programmer was Carl Reed, Ph.D. MOSS was originally developed on a CDC mainframe using Tektronix storage tube (models 4009 and 4014) technology for graphics output.
The NWI contract resulted in the delivery of a software package called WAMS (Wetlands Analytical Mapping System), later renamed AMS. The system architects were Cliff Greve and Harry Niedzwiadek. The AMS software was developed on an HP 3000 under the MPE operating system. The input device for the stereo imagery was an analytical stereo plotter called an APPS-IV. Graphics output was to a Tektronix 4009 storage display
After these products were delivered to USFWS, it was quickly determined that AMS and MOSS should run on the same hardware environment to support full data entry and analysis GIS functionality. Further, AMS needed to be upgraded to handle table digitizing and MOSS needed to be upgraded to handle AMS-provided files, as well as DEM processing. WELUT selected a Data General (DG) minicomputer (C-330) under the AOS operating system to be the target platform. The DG had 64KB of memory and 192MB of disk. Autometric was awarded the follow-on contract to port and enhance AMS. Dr. Reed became a federal employee and was tasked with porting and upgrading MOSS.
While the initial contract work was being performed, HRB Singer of Pennsylvania was also placed under contract to WELUT. As part of this effort, they were tasked with developing a plan for implementing the Western Data Support Center. Eric Strand was the technical manager for HRB Singer. This center was to provide photo interpretation, map digitizing, and GIS processing services. The report was delivered to WELUT in August 1977. WELUT determined that they should proceed with the plan. Implementation began in 1978 and the center was ready in late 1978 when the AMS and MOSS efforts began on the Data General mini-computer. Denny Parker was the first manager of the Data Center.
Also during the same period, Colorado State University was under contract to WELUT to provide personnel for programming and other development-related services. This contract was initially put in place in early 1979. Two of the first employees were Mr. Jim Kramer and Mr. Randy Frosh. Their first task was to develop a Cartographic Output System (COS). This work began in 1979 and continued through 1980, when Mr. Frosh became a federal employee.
The port and integration of the AMS, MOSS and COS programs was fairly well completed by the end of 1979. As a result of management changes, as well as changes in focus, Carl Reed decided to leave the federal government. He took a job with Autometric in January 1980. As part of this transition, an Autometric office was opened in Fort Collins. The first major contract for Autometric was to install, train, modify and support AMS, MOSS and COS in the Bureau of Land Management office in Portland, Oregon. The second major contract awarded to Autometric was with Colorado State University for providing support services to WELUT and the BLM. This contract was awarded in late 1980. Immediately, Mr. Kramer and Mr. Danny Alberts were hired by Autometric to perform the technical and support tasks. Meanwhile, WELUT began developing the MAPS raster processing system under the direction of Mr. Frosh.
The Colorado State University contract terminated in 1982. Another support contract, with Martell, also terminated in 1982. A new support contract was awarded to TGS (Technicolor Government Services). Autometric became a subcontractor to TGS for software development services. The TGS contract was managed by Mr. Dave Linden. As part of the transition, existing Colorado State University and Martell technical staff were hired by TGS. These staff included Ms. Laure Pawenska and Ms. Carol Lloyd. In 1983, Mr. John Lee joined the TGS team. Also in 1983, Autometric hired Mr. Frosh, who had decided to leave the federal government, and Dr. Robert Starling, who had left a environmental consulting firm in Alaska.
In 1984, the Fort Collins office of Autometric, consisting of Dr. Reed, Dr. Starling, Mr. Kramer and Mr. Frosh, was awarded a contract for generating a detailed design for converting the MOSS data storage structure from a full polygon to a topological data structure. At the same time, the Fort Collins staffwas also involved in two other major R&D efforts that were critical to the eventual design of GenaMap. One was with the US. Army Topographic Lab (ETL) in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This contract focused on using GIS for terrain analysis for Army applications. The hardware platform was a UNIX-based HP series 550 workstation. The other work focused on performing basic research and writing white papers on many facets of future directions in GIS. This work was performed as part of the proposal preparation effort for the prime contractors who were bidding MARK 90 and 92. These were the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) modernization contracts. As a result of these contracts, the Fort Collins staff was able to spend considerable time reading, thinking and talking about GIS technology for future systems. About this time, Ms. Anne Hunter joined the staff as a part-time employee while finishing her master's degree at Colorado State University.
In early 1985, the Fort Collins staff recognized that the federal government support of MOSS, COS and sMAPS was problematic. Further, funding was sparse, the government could not demonstrate any form of product strategy, and the GIS focus was very disperse. As a result, the staff began to hold informal meetings at a local restaurant. These meetings resulted in the presentation of a formal proposal to the Autometric home office in
Washington, D.C., for the design and implementation of a new-generation, commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS), UNIX-based, topologically oriented GIS. Autometric responded positively to the proposal. Design work for this system began in April and was completed in July 1985.
In July, a thorough design review was performed. A "red team" from Autometric headquarters and the design team from Fort Collins spent two weeks evaluating the design for consistency, completeness and feasibility. Based on this review, the go-ahead was given to implement an alpha version of the software. The alpha development had to be completed by October 1, 1985. The development integration platform was an lIP 9000 series 200 workstation running the UNIX operating system, which was one of the first workstations running UNIX. Much of the actual software coding and compilation testing was performed on a Data General desktop computer. The agreed-upon name for the new GIS was Deltamap.
Concurrent with the design and development process was a developing relationship with an Australian company that was looking for a mapping system to integrate with their existing local government solutions software. This company, called Genasys II Pty. Ltd., was a long-time supplier of administrative and records management software for local government. Their software operated on HP 3000 computers. The company's managing director, Mr. Trevor Wilson, traveled to the United States to look for a GIS software vendor that Genasys could work with to develop this integrated solution. Through a mutual contact at Winnebago County, Wisconsin (where MOSS, COS and AMS was
installed) - Mr. Dave Schmidt - Mr. Wilson learned about Autometric. Mr. Wilson came to Fort Collins and quickly determined that we were the group he wished to work with. Even though we could not demonstrate Deltamap, he agreed to become our Australian distributor.
As part of this agreement, Dr. Reed and Dr. Starling traveled to Australia in September 1985 to present a series of 12 seminars to local government officials. These seminars served two purposes: 1) To begin selling the mapping system to the Genasys installed base, and 2) to validate many of the assumptions made in designing Deltamap. In many respects, this trip was the proof-in-concept validation that was necessary for Autometric
as a corporation to decide to bring Deltamap to market.
In October 1985, Autometric management came to Fort Collins to review progress. The Fort Collins team, which by now included Mr. John Davidson, was able to demonstrate the alpha version of Delta map and Deltacell and obtain approval to bring the product to market. The remainder of the year was devoted to finishing version 1.2 of the product and developing an initial documentation package. A basic market strategy was also initiated: sell into existing HP local government accounts. It was imperative to develop an installed base, and this was perceived as being the best way to achieve this goal.
The product actually came to market in the first quarter of 1986. The first sales calls were made, and a series of seminars with HP initiated. In April 1986, Autometric split the Fort Collins office into two groups. One group continued to perform support services for the federal government and the public domain packages MOSS, AMS, MAPS and COS. This group was headed by Dr. Bruce Morse. Dr. Morse now works for UGC Consulting. The other group was headed by Dr. Reed.
This group, which included the original design and development team, was actually split off as a wholly owned subsidiary of Autometric called Deltasystems. One of the stipulations was that Deltasystems would not sell Deltamap into the Federal government marketplace for a period of not less than two years, which avoided competition with the MOSS family of software. (2015 note: In retrospect, this was a REALLY bad decision)
The first port of Deltamap (GenaMap) was initiated in the fall of 1986 to a MASSCOMP computer, performed at a customer's request. This port was relatively difficult and quickly educated the development staff that a more machine independent development environment could be implemented that would dramatically facilitate software ports to other UNIX platforms in the future. We did not know it at the time, but many of the design objectives stated after this first port are many of the concepts now used when Open Systems are discussed. By the end of the first year, we were able to develop an installed base of six customers worldwide. Unbelievably, the company broke even in its first full year of operation. By the end of the second year, we had a worldwide installed base of 18 customers. During 1987, the Deltasystems staff began to feel that Autometric did not represent the best corporate structure for developing and selling COTS GIS. This was because Autometric was primarily a Department of Defense contractor that specialized in developing prototype software systems. Deltasystems wanted to develop a sales- and support-oriented corporate climate in which technology was an integral part, but not the end goal. In 1987, we implemented the first windows version of Deltamap using HP Windows.
By early 1988, Autometric management agreed with this analysis and gave Deltasystems approval to find outside investors to buy the Deltasystems stock. Also in 1988, the first annual Users Conference was held. In this first Conference, there were only 22 attendees. During 1988, the development staff adopted X Windows as the ideal window management environment. By the end of 1987, Deltamap was operational on
three different platforms - HP, SGI and MASSCOMP. By early 1989, we found an interested party for buying 100 percent of the Deltasystem's stock - Genasys. They had just completed a stellar year in Australia, capped with the winning of SLIC, a huge statewide GIS-LIS project (based on use of Deltamap ). Thus, in April 1989, the ownership of Delta systems changed hands. The company name was changed to Genasys II, Inc. The product name was changed to GenaMap to conform with the name used in Australia. The name changes, while perceived as being good in terms of long-term global recognition, impacted our ability to conduct business. As a result, 1989 was the first year the company did not experience a rapid growth. During the same period, Genasys Fort Collins hired our first full-time sales staff. We were also able to once again market into the federal government. We immediately added two additional vertical markets: defense, and environmental, including forestry. Both of these markets took more than 12 months to develop but now represent more than 40 percent of the Genasys business base. In addition, the software was ported to the Sun hardware platform. Full continuous mapping was released in 1989. A distributor for Mexico was signed in 1989. In December 1989, the first version of the GenaCivil product line was released on HP workstations.
In March 1990, Genasys developed a joint venture with Pyser Holdings, PIc. of London to start an operation in England. This office's goal was to sell GenaMap directly into England and Scotland, and to develop a distributor network in Europe. Simon Thompson was hired to perform technical support. Genasys already had a distributor in Holland. The new office quickly signed a distributor for Spain.